This paper examines different ways of measuring power and the use of these measures in the context of the European Union. The paper deals with classical power indices of co-operative games and more recent non-cooperative a priori measures.
Introduction
Influence is a crucial element in any decision-making institution. The role of the decisionmaking rules or, more generally, institution design is to affect power relations in institutions where decisions are made.
Quantitative analysis of decision-making rules can be divided into two parts: the other based on co-operative games and the other on non-cooperative games. Recently, there has been a lively debate between two schools of thought on the appropriate tools and approaches that should be used to assess and design different constitutional decision-making rules.
Scholars of co-operative game theory apply different power indices. They are applied for assessing the implications of different decision-making rules on actors' influence in decision-making. The considered agents have no particular preferences and form winning coalitions which then implement unspecified policies. Individual chances of being part of and influencing a winning coalition are then measured by a power index. By defining some desirable distribution of actors' power the actual distribution of power can then be evaluated.
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The second approach uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of explicit decision procedures and given preferences over a well-defined policy space.
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In this approach, conclusions are based on equilibrium analysis. This requires more detailed information regarding the players' preferences. As such non-cooperative approach does not fit to design of constitutional rules but by considering several realizations of actors' preference configurations one is able to draw conclusions on performance of the constitutional rules.
This unified approach can also be seen as a bridge between the two distinct approaches as it will be demonstrated later in this paper. 1 For resent applications see e.g. Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) , Baldwin et al. (2000 Baldwin et al. ( , 2001 , Felsenthal and Machover (2001) , and Leech (2002) for recent applications of traditional power indices. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Nurmi (1998) contain a more general discussion regarding index-based analysis of power.
2 See e.g. Steunenberg (1994) , Tsebelis (1994 Tsebelis ( , 1996 , Crombez (1996 Crombez ( , 1997 , and Moser (1996 Moser ( , 1997 .
This paper surveys different ways to assess power relations in decision-making institutions using the above mentioned distinction as the starting point. The emphasis of the analysis is on a priori evaluation of power and hence constitutional analysis decision-making rules. The main question posed in this part of the paper is the design of decision-making rules, how different ways of assessing decision-making can give advice in the design and what kind of questions the different approaches are able to answer.
In the latter part of the paper, we illustrate the usage of the measures in the design of the decision-making rules of the European Union (EU), which is topical issue due to the EU enlargement and the ongoing constitution debate. Experiences of European integration, especially the Nice reforms in 2000, also demonstrate that the design of decision-making procedures and voting rules belong to the most difficult parts of constitutional arrangements. Since the institutional arrangements and decision-making in the EU are more based on ad hoc solutions rather than clear constitutional principles unnecessary additional costs cannot be avoided. Moreover, as the entry of new member states requires incumbent countries' unanimous agreement, threats of vetoing a candidate country's entry can be used to gain in negotiations on required reforms in institutional rules. To avoid the bias to decision-making institutions caused by the seek of short run gains the task of the constitution is to design the institutional structure and the decision-making rules using acceptable transparent principles that are transparent and as neutral to changes in membership as possible.
In the following, we start presenting the tools from classical power measures. Then
we proceed to what we call the unified approach. It is based on equilibrium analysis of the legislative phase using the constitutional rules of playing that stage. As also in this case the main emphasis is on how well the rules work the unified approach takes several legislation games and hence several players' preference configurations into account. These approaches are the applied to EU decision-making and the the results are compared.
Measuring power
In this section, we survey the concepts that are often used in the design of constitutional rules and further illustrated in our analysis.
Traditional intra-institutional approach
An often used object of studies of decision power in co-operative games is a weighted coalitional form voting game v that is characterized by a set of players, N = {1, . . . , n}, a voting weight for each player, w i ≥ 0 (i ∈ N ), and a minimal quota of weights that is needed for a passage of a proposal, q > 0. Subsets of players, S ⊆ N , are called coalitions, and if a coalition S meets the quota, i. e. i∈S w i ≥ q, it is a winning coalition.
Formation of a winning coalition is assumed to be desirable to its members, e. g. because they can jointly pass policy proposals that are in their interest. More generally, a winning coalition need not be determined by voting weights. Players' marginal contributions to coalitions and hence outcomes form the basis for power measurement in cooperative games.
To answer the question of individual effect generally to all coalitions in P(N ), we need to specify, for example, a probability model for the voting process. An agent's behaviour is specified as a probability distribution P for players' acceptance rates, denoting the probabilities of a 'yes'-vote by individual players. Particular player's a priori power is then taken to be his probability of casting a decisive vote, i. e. to pass a proposal that would not have passed had he voted 'no' instead of 'yes'.
As far as we are dealing with the distribution of power in one voting body the power index approach is straightforward. Using the class of winning coalitions as the base of 4 analysis counts how often players are in a swing position, given the chosen probability model. Let x i be the probability that player i favours a proposal and x a n-vector of these probabilities called the acceptability vector (see Straffin 1988 for details). If we randomize the issue of vote, acceptability vector gives the probabilities that player i belongs to an arbitrary coalition S, i.e. the probabilities that (s)he will support the passage of a randomly chosen proposal. Supposing that each player votes 'yes' or 'no' independently of each other, we can write for any fixed S ⊂ N , the probability P {S = S} = i∈S x i i / ∈S (1 − x i ). If we take the sum of these probabilities multiplied by values of characteristic function over all possible coalitions, we will have the mathematical expectation for the value of function v.
This expectation is often called the multilinear extension f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of v (Owen 1972) .
It can be shown that the ith partial derivative of f (x 1 , ..., x n ) is the expected value of player i s marginal contribution to the coalition S, where the summation is taken over the class V i of vu ln erable winning coalitions with respect to player i in voting games. Thus each M i contains the coalitions in which i is a swing-player and we get
which can be interpreted as the expectation of an agent's power. For the calculation purposes we need to define the x i probabilities explicitly. To fully disregard players' preferences we adopt the independence assumption whereby probabilities x i are independently uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . This assumption is closest to pure constitutional analysis of voting rules. An alternative is to assume that voters are homogeneous, i.e. their acceptance rates to a proposal are positively correlated. This yields x i = t and t is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
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If we now calculate the expectation of individual effect assuming independence 5 For a more detailed discussion, see Straffin (1977 Straffin ( , 1988 or Owen (1972 Owen ( , 1995 .
the Penrose-Banzhaf measure (PBM). The PBM can be interpreted as player i s probability of having a swing in a vulnerable coalition, i.e. in a coalition that can be turned from winning into losing by at least one of its members. To assess relative power the PBM is often normalized and then referred to as the (normalized) Banzhaf index (NBI). It can be written as follows
Note that swings are defined using players' positions in coalitions but the NBI gives a player's share of all swings as defined above. This implies that the probability model that illustrates the PBM is destroyed by normalization.
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Assuming homogeneity we get the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) as follows
In the classical voting power literature of institutional design, either the PBM or NBI are more often applied than the SSI. An often heared reasoning behind this choice stems from . This in turn gives more weight to the middle-sized coalitions.
Inter-institutional power in co-operative approach
Inter-institutional aspects play a significant role in the design of constitutional decisionmaking rules and procedures. For instance, the EU Treaties define explicitly the actors that are involved in decision-making and the procedures, i.e. the sequence of moves, of how decisions are made. This also means that procedural aspects are important since the sequence in which the main institutions act in decision-making is defined as a part of the voting rules.
In cooperative games, the traditional way to approach inter-institutional relations is to model the procedures as composite games. 
The composition of games can be interpreted as a division into committees or institutions involved with a decision-making procedure. As a model to EU procedures composite game approach reduces the decision-making process into one simultaneous move game. M j .
The multilinear extension of the composite game v can now be expressed as
) .
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and the general power measure for a composite games is
where we can apply the same vector of acceptance rates (x 1 , ..., x n ) as above.
Unified approaches
As mentioned above, the non-cooperative approach serves as an alternative for investigating decision-making institutions. In the literature, the criticism towards the co-operative approach is two-fold. First, despite to some attempts, 7 the indices cannot take strategic inter-institutional or procedural aspects of EU decision-making into account and, second, they do not explicitly consider players' preferences but rather attempt to model voting behaviour more directly for instance using acceptance probabilities
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. The latter drawback is not, however, necessarily severe in the design of constitutional rules. It can also be seen as a reason to support abstract cooperative approach but the former has to be taken more seriously even in constitutional analysis.
When there are more than one decision making institutions involved or when one is investigating the interaction between several institutions classical power index approach faces problems as it assumes that players are voting or moving simultaneously, which is rarely the case in decision making procedures. Consider a simple agenda setting game where we have an institution that makes a legislative proposal to a decision making body which either accepts or rejects the proposal. Simultaneous coalition based approach can only use the fact that all winning coalitions must contain the acceptance of the agenda setting institution plus a required majority in decision making institution. This approach, however, completely disregards the fact that the agenda setter moves first -decision making is procedural not simultaneous. Suppose for simplicity that the agenda setter is a single player and the passage of a proposal requires unanimous acceptance in the decision making 7 See e.g. Kirman & Widgrén (1995) and Laruelle & Widgrén (2001) .
8 See, however Widgrén (1995) , Hosli (2001) or Kirman & Widgrén (1995) . 8 body. Then the power index approach suggests that each player in the latter is as powerful as the former but it is not trivially true since the agenda setter moves first.
Partially as a reply to this critique (see e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 1997 , 1999a , 1999b , 2001 ) a recent literature, which attempts to combine the desirable elements of co-operative approach and non-cooperative approach has developed. Steunenberg et al. (1999) isolate "the ability of a player to make a difference in the outcome" (p. 362). They note that "[h]aving a preference that lies close to the equilibrium outcome of a particular game does not necessarily mean that this player is also powerful ". Therefore, they suggest to consider not one particular state of the world ξ but many.
In particular, one can consider each λ i and the status quo q to be realizations of random variablesλ i andq, respectively. If P denotes the joint distribution of random vectorξ := (q,λ 1 , . . . ,λ n ) and · the Euclidean norm, then
gives the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome for decision procedure Γ and player i's ideal outcome. Strategic power index of Steunenberg et al. (1999) is based on the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome and its ideal point. In order to obtain not only a ranking of players but a cardinal measure of their power, they proceed by considering a dummy player d whose preferences vary over the same range as the preferences 9 of actual players but who does not have any decision-making rights. This leads to their definition of the strategic power index (StPI) as
However, (5) Under special conditions -which eliminate all strategic aspects from the StPI -there exists a link between the StPI and the PBM discovered by Felsenthal and Machover (2001a) (see also Napel and Widgrén, 2002) .
The criticism towards classical power indices above does not mean, however, that the core of the traditional power index approach, namely a player's marginal contribution to the outcome, is useless. For this reason, Napel & Widgrén (2002) propose to extend above analysis from the simple coalition framework of a priori power measurement and the very basic voting game to a more general framework. First, take a player's marginal contribution as the best available indicator of his potential or ability to make a difference, i. e. his a posteriori power. Second, if this is of normative interest or a necessity for lack of precise data, calculate a priori power as expected a posteriori power. Expectation can be with respect to several different aspects of a posteriori power such as actions, preferences, or procedure. Napel and Widgrén (2002) call the shadow outcome. The shadow outcome is the group's decision which would have resulted if the player whose power is under consideration had chosen differently than he a posteriori did, e. g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when he a posteriori belongs to it. In simple games, the difference between shadow outcome and actual outcome is either 0 or 1. Richer decision framework allows for more finely graded a posteriori power.
In this approach, impact is relative to a what-if scenario or what
To illustrate this more in detail, let Λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) be the collection of n players' 
as a reasonable measure of player i's ex post power provided that above limit exists. This is simply the directional derivative of the equilibrium outcome in the direction h or α.
Other measures for the multidimensional case can be based on the gradient of x * (λ i , λ −i ) (holding λ −i constant). Using the ex post power above we can define a corresponding ex ante measure as
Using a suitable probability distribution of players' ideal policy positions. Let us refer to this index to as Napel-Widgrén index (NWI). One person one vote (OPOV) principle is a cornerstone in designing democratic institutions and fair allocation of power in a federation or two-tier decision-making in general.
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In big states citizens have less power in choosing their national government than citizens in small states. This requires that the big states are compensated in the Council voting weights. The right compensation to ensures OPOV principle is the well known square-root rule due to Penrose (1946) . Applied to the EU Council, fair power of countries should be determined by their square-root shares of population. Hence fair power of country i can be expressed as
where m i denotes the population of country i and β * the fair (Banzhaf) index of power. Laruelle & Widgrén (1998) There is, however, one undesirable property in weighting based on square-roots of populations, namely it requires quite high majority threshold to avoid the possibility that a minority of Member States is able to pass proposals. The square-root shares of populations of the 10 biggest EU Member States sum up to 63 per cent in the EU27. The same property holds for the decided voting weights as well. One way to exclude undesirable winning coalitions is to introduce an additional requirement which explicitly does this.
Noteworthy, a safety-net like this has an impact on power distribution.
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The Treaty of Nice introduced a two-fold safety-net, which requires that a qualified majority should, in addition to sufficient vote threshold, contain an absolute majority of member states and represent at least 62 per cent of EU population.
In together with absolute majority of member states implements the square-root rule almost exactly. In the EU27, a higher square-rooted population threshold seems to work slightly better. In dual majorities of member states and their population a lower than 62 per cent population quota seems to mimic the square-root rule better. As an overall conclusion, a simple dual majority that was proposed by the Commission in IGC-2000 performs slightly worse the voting weights agreed in Nice if the emphasis is on the coefficient. The Nice weights also imply a smaller sum of squared differences between, according to the squareroot rule, fair and actual allocation of power in the EU15 but not in the EU-27. In fact, there is a substantial increase with this respect when Nice weights are used in the EU27
indicating that despite the better average performance the differences at individual Member State level show worse performance.
In sum, the results in table 1 suggest that weighted voting turn out to be unstable in fulfilling the square-root rule at one actor level. This is mainly due to the fact that determination of voting weights is based not on country characteristics like population of one country but many. Member States are divided into clusters of countries and the division lines are partially arbitrary. Dual majority rules can be interpreted as weighted voting games with a safety-net which guarantees the support of an absolute majority of member states for the passage of a proposal. Contrary to the Nice rules dual majorities have theoretical foundations. Dual majority rule applies the definition of the EU as the union of citizens and the union of states whereas square-rooted dual majority applies fairness criterion for two-tier decision-making more directly.
Should we ever rely on the SSI in the design of constitutional rules. With this respect the standard answer is no. The PBM assumes that all coalitions have the same probability of occurrence. This supports its usage as the index, indeed, takes 'behind the veil of ignorance' literally.
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If the voting rules are understood as triples of voting weights, vote thresholds and procedures this does not necessarily use all the information available in the procedure. In unified approaches below the basis of ex ante assessment is ex post equilibrium analysis, which makes the set-up more game theoretic and which may give support to use the SSI as an appropriate power measure. More specifically, assuming spatial preferences the NWI allocates power according to the SSI at intra-institutional level. This gives theoretical support for using it.
Power in EU procedures

The main procedures of the EU
In composite games, it is implicitly assumed that the actors move simultaneously. are likely to over-estimate the power of late-movers and under-estimate the power of the first-mover, like the agenda setter. In the following, we investigate inter-institutional power in the EU and the difference between the results based on composite game and unified approaches.
The EU has three main decision-making bodies: the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (EP) and two main decision-making procedures: consultation and codecision procedure. In consultation procedure, the Commission proposes and the Council decides. Unanimous Council can amend a Commission proposal. The Commission can also decide to not to propose and then the legislative status quo 0 prevails. The Commission, thus exerts agenda-setting power and gate-keeping power and the Council decision-making power. These cannot be separated appropriately in standard cooperative analysis but our equilibrium based analysis gives a better picture of different powers. In our models the Commission is assumed to be a unitary actor -national views are assumed not to play a role.
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The Council is assumed to be a voting body of currently 15 and, after eastern enlargement has fully taken place, 27 member states. The EP is modelled following the standard tradition as a unitary actor as well.
The way how a cooperative coalition based model can approach the Consultation procedure is simply to define the win-sets of a game. In consultation procedure they are
• the Commission plus a qualified majority in the Council (refers to column CN1 in tables below)
• unanimity in the Council (refers to column CN2 in tables below).
Co-decision procedure is more complicated. The main difference to consultation procedure is is that co-decision gives significant powers to the EP. A Commission proposal goes to the EP to its first reading where it can accept a proposal or amend it. In each case the proposal, the original or amended, goes to the Council where it can be accepted or further In composite game approach to co-decision procedure, we obtain two potential win-sets as follows
• the Commission, a qualified majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the EP (refers to column CD1 in tables below)
• a qualified majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the EP (refers to column CD2 in tables below).
Again, it is worth noting, however that the Commission has the right to initiate or decide to not to initiate. This gate-keeping role of the Commission means that the true 14 Presidency model is not the only way to approach co-decision procedure. We use it here for the sake of comparison to the analysis of Steunenberg & Dimitrova (1999) that applies StPI to co-decision modelled using presidency model. For alternative approaches see Napel & Widgrén (2003) where co-decision is modelled as Rubinstein's alternative offers bargaining game.
distribution of power lies in both procedures between the two cases -with and without amendments -and depends on preferences. Table 1 gives the inter-institutional power in the EU15 using the pre-Nice voting weights and the PBM. Column heads CD1 and CD2 refer to co-decision procedure and CD1E
The composite game approach
and CD2E to their respective counterparts after the enlargement. In CD1 and CD1E it is assumed that the Commission exerts power as a member of a winning coalition and in CD2
and CD2E it is assumed that the Commission exerts only gate-keeping power (see Figure   3 above) above). Abbreviations CN and CNE stand for consultation procedure before and after enlargement respectively. Table 2 gives the respective SSIs. Tables 1 and 2 show that the inter-institutional balance of power is practically not affected by eastern enlargement. This conclusion is very robust regardless of the enlargement and hence the number of new member states added. The most notable effect is two percentage points decline of the Council's power in consultation procedure.
The figures in
This is due to expanding membership as unanimous Council can amend the Commission
proposal an unanimity is harder to achieve in the EU27 than in EU15.
According to the classical power indices the Council is the most powerful actor in both procedures. This contradicts with the standard conclusion of spatial voting games that the Commission is the most powerful actor (e.g. Steunenberg et al. 1999) due to its first-mover advantage.
The results are also different when different classical power indices are used to measurement. The SSI suggests that inter-institutional power remains practically unchanged after the enlargement where as the PBM suggests that the enlargement has a significant impact on actors' power and also to the intra-institutional distribution of power. In absolute terms, all actors lose and the change in relative power affects more the Commission or the EP than the Council. In sum, the cooperative analysis suggests that expanding membership may decrease all actors' power resulting mainly from deteriorating passage probability of 
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The majority rule is m ≤ n. 
where Ω * refers to the equilibrium outcome, µ * refers to the ideal policy position of the pivotal player and which is accepted by voters (n), . . . , (n − m + 1) and by
.
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This states more formally that, first, only the spatial swing player (n − m + 1) may have an influence on the outcome and, second, he actually has an influence only for particular preference constellations.
For the Commission γ we get the a posteriori (strategic) power
and for a member state in the Council i
For ex ante considerations, suppose that the ideal policy positions are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. We get 16 Note that the ideal point λ (n−m+1) of the pivotal player is unique. In qualified majority voting there are two potential pivotal players but agenda setting makes the equilibrium unique.
where k ∈ {γ, µ * }.
Co-decision procedure
Here we assume that the government of a member state that is holding Presidency exerts agenda-setting power in the Conciliation Committee. This may, however, over-estimate the role of the Council since the meetings of the committee are co-chaired by a Vice-President of the EP and a minister of a member state that is holding Presidency. Suppose first that the Presidency exerts agenda setting power in the conciliation committee. In the postAmsterdam version of the co-decision procedure, the Commission does not have a role in the conciliation committee. In the conciliation committee we get the following sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
where µ P refers to the ideal point of the member state that is holding Presidency µ refers to the ideal point of a semi-pivotal player of a sub-game in the Council without the government that is holding Presidency. Note that the Commission exerts only gate-keeping power in this procedure. This holds in terms of a posterior power since
and in terms of a priori power since P min µ , 
and for the government that is holding Presidency as follows
and, finally, for the semi-pivotal position in the Council
Assuming uniformly distributed ideal points this gives us the following a priori power for the actors
where k ∈ {π, µ, µ * }.
Assessment
Let us next evaluate the procedures using the NWI and StPI presented above. Tables 4   and 5 give the strategic power indices and the effects of Nice reforms on majority threshold before and after the enlargement and the effects of enlargement with under pre-Nice and 24 
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The total effect can be computed either by by taking the effect of enlargement under the old threshold and then the threshold effect or by taking the effect of the change in threshold and then the effect of the enlargement under the new threshold.
The total effects are shown on the two rightmost columns of the third row. As before EP refers to the European Parliament, CM to the Council and EC to the Commission. In both tables columns 2 and 3 give the pre-enlargement figures, columns 4 and 5 post-enlargement figures and columns 6 and 7 the differences.
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the Council gains in both procedures. The Commission gains in consultation procedure and the EP loses in co-decision procedure. In both cases the total effects are very small. Note that the Commission is powerless in co-decision procedure -it only exerts gate-keeping power. The equilibrium outcome does not depend on Commission's preferences unless it refuses to initiate and the legislative status quo prevails.
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The results in tables 4 and 5 share the common property that the inter-institutional 17 Here we disregard the effects of the changes in intra-Council distribution of power. According to the earlier results the power distribution within the Council does not have a significant effect on interinstitutional distribution of power at the aggregate level. Let us next compare three different approaches to measure inter-institutional power, namely composite game approach and two variants of strategic power measures. In the former, we concentrate on the SSI. As to our knowledge there are no studies using the strategic power index of Steunenberg et al. (1999) in evaluating post-Nice rules we concentrate on EU15 and the majority thresholds that are currently in use. Tables 6 and 7 give the respective results in consultation and co-decision procedures.
The first observation in both cases is that the composite game SSI and the NWI give qualitatively rather similar results and that the StPI differs from these significantly. In fact, in both procedures the StPI ranks the actors differently from the composite game SSI and the NWI. In consultation procedure, it suggests that the Commission is more powerful than the Council and, in co-decision procedure, that the EP exerts more power than the Council. These differences illustrate the fundamental difference between the StPI, which uses the average distances between outcomes and actors' policy positions as the source of power whereas the two other indices rely on marginal contributions.
A major difference between he composite game SSI and the NWI is that the former considers the procedures as simultaneous decisions whereas the latter models the procedures as procedural non-cooperative games. This raises the question of the first-mover advantage. In consultation procedure, the Commission is the first-mover making a proposal but unanimous Council can amend the proposal, which keeps the first-mover advantage almost completely in hands of the Commission. In co-decision procedure, the situation is different. Like the equilibrium analysis above suggested the Commission's role is considerably diminished. This stems from the fact that the EP and the Council apply the same quota for acceptance of the Commission proposals and for amendments that do not require Commission's support. In the analysis we have moreover assumed that the member state that is holding Council presidency has an initiator's role in the conciliation committee. Tables 6 and 7 show that in consultation procedure, indeed, the NWI gives higher power score to the Commission than the CGSSI. In the case of the Commission the theoretical maximum power is one in both cases. The CGSSI is based on Commission's presence in a winning coalition and can, therefore, be seen as a measure of Commission's gate-keeping power. The difference between the NWI and CGSSI illustrates, on the other hand, its Council to the legislative status quo. This makes the need for using gate-keeping power (on average) less urgent under unanimity rule than in qualified majority voting.
For the Council the theoretical maximum value of the CGSSI is one and the maximum of the NWI index is 2.
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Relative to these maxima the Council exerts less power according to the NWI than according to the CGSSI. This is intuitively plausible since the Commission's gains due to its agenda setting power in the NWI. The Council's absolute power figures remain almost identical though.
The StPI gives different results. It gives a higher power score to the Commission than to the Council and both actors' power decrease when QMV is replaced by unanimity rule.
The theoretical maxima are one for both actors. The reason for this is the fact that power stems from a small distance between the ideal policy positions and outcomes. Unanimity rule tends to shift the equilibrium outcome towards the extreme positions whereas under QMV outcomes are closer to the centre of the policy space.
In co-decision procedure, the CGSSI and the NWI suggest that the Council is more powerful than the EP whereas the StPI suggests the opposite. The latter gives, however, more power to the member state that is holding presidency in the Council than to the 
Concluding remarks
This paper has surveyed different methods of evaluating actors' power in voting games.
Our emphasis was in ex ante assessment of power. The standard tools for this are classical power indices of co-operative games. Power indices have been criticized as they disregard actors' preferences, all strategic aspects and inter-institutional relationships. If power indices are used in the design of constitutional rules the first source of criticism does not hit the target. The fact that power indices abstract preferences can be seen as a desirable property when the objective is to design institutions. The two other sources of criticism should, however, be taken more seriously. They are both closely related with the fact that legislation and decision-making in institutions like the EU are procedural whereas power indices are static concepts.
In power index literature, there are some attempts to capture the inter-institutional aspects using composite game approach. As it is as static as standard coalitional form voting games and hence power indices they do not help in explaining strategic and interinstitutional aspects in a satisfactory way.
In the recent literature of power indices, there are several attempts to reply to criticism towards power indices or (abstract) a priori approach in general. First wave of this literature (see e.g. Widgrén 1995 , Kirman & Widgrén 1995 concentrated in making different assumptions concerning actors' preferences. In power index models, this is often made by making assumptions on players' rates of acceptance towards a proposal or on probabilities 29 of supporting a proposal. This line of research rather investigates and models different voting situations and, therefore, does not fit to the design of constitutional rules.
Another and more recent approach stems from non-cooperative models of voting and decision-making procedures. This unified approach is based on equilibrium analysis of the decision-making procedure. The rules of the game are understood more widely than in cooperative games since the explicit procedure is included. Ex ante analysis is then carried out by randomizing actors preferences. In this line of research there are two variants:
first the one where power is defined as the expected distance between the outcome and an actor's ideal policy position and, second, the one where the original definition of power as marginal contribution in coalitional form games is restored. The former approach is limited to spatial voting whereas the latter is not.
In this paper, we used EU decision-making as an example to demonstrate how different approaches work. We argue that classical co-operative approach is still valid in dealing with intra-institutional distribution of power, like in the EU Council of Ministers. Here the usual approach relies on the Banzhaf index of power but this paper demonstrates that the use of the Shapley-Shubik index may be justified as well. In inter-institutional relations unified approach is more appropriate. Here the composite game approach seems, however, give consistent picture with the marginal contribution based unified approach.
Nevertheless this picture is only partial.
